



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



File: LIN-99-246-50529 Office: Nebraska Service Center

Date: SEP 19 2000

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



Petition: Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

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FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Terrence M. O'Reilly, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a church. It seeks classification of the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4), to serve as a music director. The director denied the petition determining that the petitioner had failed to establish the beneficiary's two years of continuous religious work experience.

On appeal, counsel argues that the beneficiary is eligible for the benefit sought.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

- (i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;

- (ii) seeks to enter the United States--

- (I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,

- (II) before October 1, 2000, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or

- (III) before October 1, 2000, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and

- (iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year period described in clause (i).

At issue in the director's decision is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary had two years of continuous work experience in the proffered position.

8 C.F.R. 204.5(m) (1) states, in pertinent part, that:

All three types of religious workers must have been performing the vocation, professional work, or other work continuously (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

The petition was filed on August 23, 1999. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary had been continuously working in the prospective occupation for at least the two years from August 23, 1997 to August 23, 1999.

In its letter dated August 10, 1999, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary "has been working as our Music Director since August 1997 to present . . . Ever since he came to the United States in 1995, he has been studying at the American Conservatory of Music in Chicago for his Bachelor of Music degree." The petitioner submitted a photocopy of the beneficiary's transcript from the American Conservatory of Music.

On December 27, 1999, the director requested that the petitioner submit evidence of the beneficiary's work experience during the two-year period prior to filing. In response, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary "worked full time as Music Director . . . without payment until he became an R-1 religious worker in February 1999."

On appeal, counsel argues that the beneficiary's studies did not "interrupt the religious work." Counsel cited Matter of Z-, 5 I&N Dec. 700 (Comm. 1954) to support her argument. In Matter of Z-, the Commissioner held that continued study by an ordained member of the clergy was not interruptive of his or her continuous practice of a religious vocation. The beneficiary in this case is not an ordained member of the clergy and has never been engaged in a religious vocation as defined in this proceeding. Accordingly, any period of time spent studying at a music conservatory does not constitute continuous work experience in a religious occupation.

Counsel further argues that the "federal regulations do not require that one have to be paid in order to have the requisite work experience." Counsel's argument that the regulations do not stipulate an explicit requirement that the work experience must have been full-time paid employment in order to be considered qualifying is correct. This is in recognition of the special circumstances of some religious workers, specifically those engaged

in a religious vocation, in that they may not be salaried in the conventional sense and may not follow a conventional work schedule. 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(2) defines a religious vocation, in part, as a calling to religious life evidenced by the taking of vows. The regulations therefore recognize a distinction between someone practicing a life-long religious calling and a lay employee. The regulation defines religious occupations, in contrast, in general terms as an activity related to a traditional religious function. *Id.* In order to qualify for special immigrant classification in a religious occupation, the job offer for a lay employee of a religious organization must show that he or she will be employed in the conventional sense of full-time salaried employment. See 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(4). Therefore, the prior work experience must have been full-time salaried employment in order to qualify as well. The absence of specific statutory language requiring that the two years of work experience be conventional full-time paid employment does not imply, in the case of religious occupations, that any form of intermittent, part-time, or volunteer activity constitutes continuous work experience in such an occupation.

Counsel refers to two unpublished administrative decisions of this Service regarding appeals of special immigrant religious worker cases and to a teleconference between AILA representatives and Service officials regarding the work experience requirement for religious worker classification to support the instant appeal. While the information in the teleconference is not binding in the administration of the Act, it must be noted that the report makes reference to the issue of secular employment as a disqualifying factor. Additionally, the unpublished administrative decisions cited by counsel do not have binding precedential value. See 8 C.F.R. 103.3(c).

The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was continuously engaged in a religious occupation from August 23, 1997 to August 23, 1999. The objection of the director has not been overcome on appeal. Accordingly, the petition may not be approved.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the prospective occupation is a religious occupation as defined at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(2) or that the beneficiary is qualified to work in a religious occupation as required at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(3). Also, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage as required at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(g)(2). As the appeal will be dismissed on the ground discussed, these issues need not be examined further.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.